

Message Text

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SAJ-01 OMB-01 H-03 NSC-10 SS-20 AEC-11 IO-14 OIC-04

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P R 241330Z JAN 74

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1347

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

URSNAAA/USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 VIENNA 0625

FROM US REP MBFR

EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: AD HOC GROUP MEETING, 23 JAN 1974

SUMMARY. THE AD HOC GROUP MEETING OF JANUARY 23, CHAIRED BY THE DANISH REP (TILLISCH), APPROVED THE AHG CHAIRMAN'S WEEKLY REPORT FOR THE WEEK OF JANUARY 14-20, APPROVED THE WESTERN PLENARY STATEMENT FOR PRESENTATION ON JANUARY 24, HEARD REPORT ON AN FRG-POLISH BILATERAL, DISCUSSED OUTLINE OF ORAL REPORT TO THE NAC TO BE PRESENTED ON JANUARY 25, AND CONTINUED DISCUSSION OF THE ALLIED TACTICS PAPER. IN FURTHER DISCUSSION OF TACTICS PAPER UK REP (ROSE) SAID HE COULD SAY NOTHING DEFINITIVE NOW ON TACTICS PAPER UNTIL HE RECEIVED LONDON'S REACTION TO PREVIOUS AHG DISCUSSION ON JANUARY 22. GROUP ADOPTED (WITH UK ACCEPTING AD REFERENDUM) SLIGHTLY MODIFIED VERSION OF ORIGINAL FORMULATION FOR PARA 6 (OUTLINING RESPONSE TO SOVIET

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INQUIRIES ABOUT THE ROLE OF THE BUNDESWEHR IN THE SECOND

PHASE) AND 7 (COVERING ALLIED REACTION TO SOVIET REQUESTS FOR INCLUSION OF AIR AND NUCLEAR FORCES). END SUMMARY.

1. BILATERALS. FRG DEP REP (HOFMANN) REPORTED A DISCUSSION WITH POLISH DELOFFS (WIECZOREK AND WOJTOWICS). MAJOR THEME OF POLISH DELEGATES WAS THAT WESTERN PROPOSAL FOR PHASE I NEGOTIATIONS CONCENTRATING ON REDUCTIONS OF US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES WOULD REQUIRE WARSAW PACT TO GIVE UP TWO VITAL FEATURES OF THE EASTERN PROPOSAL: INCLUSION OF FORCES OF EUROPEAN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE PHASE I REDUCTIONS, LEAVING POLES WITHOUT ACTIVE ROLE, AND INCLUSION OF AIR AND NUCLEAR ELEMENTS. ON SUBJECT OF PLENARIES VS. SMALL GROUPS, POLISH DELOFFS ADMITTED THAT SMALLER LESS FORMAL MEETINGS COULD BE USEFUL. HOWEVER, WEST MUST FIRST PROVIDE DEMONSTRATION THAT PROGRESS WAS BEING MADE AND THAT EAST WAS JUSTIFIED IN RELAXING PLENARY SCHEDULE AND AGREEING TO SMALL SESSIONS. FRG DEP REP COUNTERED THAT IN LESS FORMAL CIRCUMSTANCES SUCH PROGRESS WOULD BE MORE LIKELY. THE EXCHANGE WAS CHARACTERIZED BY THE FRG DEP REP AS A "CHICKEN AND EGG" TYPE OF ARGUMENT.

2. CHAIRMAN'S WEEKLY REPORT. THE AHG DISCUSSED AND ADOPTED TEXT OF THE CHAIRMAN'S WEEKLY REPORT FOR THE PERIOD 14-20 JANUARY 1974 (VIENNA 0604). THE AHG DECIDED THAT INASMUCH AS FINAL AGREEMENT HAD NOT YET BEEN REACHED ON "TACTICS PAPER", IT SHOULD NOT BE FORWARDED AS AN ANNEX TO CHAIRMAN'S REPORT, AS PREVIOUSLY AGREED (VIENNA 0493).

3. UNITED STATES PLENARY STATEMENT. AFTER BRIEF DISCUSSION, AHG APPROVED TEXT OF WESTERN PLENARY STATEMENT (VIENNA 0605) TO BE PRESENTED BY US REP IN THE PLENARY SESSION ON 24 JANUARY 1974.

4. THE CANADIAN DEPREP (MORGAN) ASKED WHY STATEMENT DID NOT DIRECTLY IDENTIFY WHICH TANK ARMY THE ALLIES WERE CONSIDERING AS THEIR OBJECTIVE FOR SOVIET REDUCTIONS. US REP REPLIED THAT ALTHOUGH THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT 3RD SHOCK ARMY WAS MOST SUITABLE REDUCTION OBJECTIVE, ALLIES SHOULD SAVE THIS POINT FOR LATER PRESENTATION.

5. TACTIC PAPER. DISCUSSION OF THE TACTICS PAPER (VIENNA 0401, 0482) WAS CONDUCTED IN THE KNOWLEDGE THAT ULTIMATE STATUS OF
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PAER WOULD NOT BE CLARIFIED UNTIL UK REP RECEIVED ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE FROM UK FCO. NEVERTHELESS, THERE WERE COMMENTS ON ALL THREE BRITISH AMENDMENTS TO THE PAPER AND TENTATIVE AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON FORMULATIONS FOR TWO OF THESE.

6. THE NETHERLANDS REP (QUARLES) LED OFF WITH SOME GENERAL REMARKS ON THE UK POSITION AS EXPRESSED IN THE PREVIOUS DAY'S AHG (JANUARY 22) (VIENNA 0618) AS HE UNDERSTOOD IT,

THE BRITISH ASSERTION WAS THAT, IN SEEKING A LIMITED PROCEDURAL UNDERSTANDING WITH THE OTHER SIDE, THE ALLIES RISKED MAKING SIGNIFICANT CONCESSIONS AND GETTING VERY LITTLE IN RETURN. THE NETHERLANDS REP DOUBTED THIS. ON THE OTHER HAND, EVEN IF THE ALLIES SUCCEEDED IN INITIATING SUBSTANTIVE EXCHANGES ON THE BASIS OF A PROCEDURAL UNDERSTANDING, WITHOUT MAKING ANY COMMITMENTS, THERE WOULD ULTIMATELY BE A POINT WHERE THE ALLIES WOULD HAVE TO "PUT THINGS ON THE TABLE" TO GAIN CONCESSIONS FROM THE WARSAW PACT. QUARLES STRESSED THAT THE AHG MUST BE IN FULL CONTROL OF THIS PROCESS AND COMMITMENTS OR CONCESSIONS MUST NOT BE MADE BEFORE THE MATTER COULD BE THOROUGHLY DISCUSSED IN THE AHG. THE ALLIES DID NOT INTEND, AS THE UK SEEMS TO FEAR, TO GIVE AWAY SUBSTANCE IN RETURN FOR MERE WORDS. FINALLY, THE NETHERLANDS REP STRESSED THAT THE ALLIES HAD A VERY REAL NEED FOR A PAPER THAT LOOKS AHEAD AS THE TACTICS PAPER DOES, BECAUSE THE ALLIES MUST HAVE A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF WHERE THEY WISH TO COME OUT ONCE DISCUSSIONS LEADING TO A LIMITED PROCEDURAL UNDERSTANDING HAVE BEGUN. TO CUT THE PAPER IN TWO PARTS, AND POSTPONE INDEFINITELY DECISION ON "FIXED PERIOD" CONCEPT, AS SUGGESTED BY THE ITALIAN REP IN AHG MEETING ON 22 JANUARY, WOULD NOT BE A GOOD SOLUTION. THE ALLIES MUST HAVE BOTH THEIR OBJECTIVES AND THE TACTICS FOR ACHIEVING THESE OBJECTIVE CLEARLY PORTRAYED IN THE TACTICS PAPER. THE ALLIES NEED TO FULLY UNDERSTAND THE SEVERAL STAGES ENVISIONED IN THEIR NEXT TACTICAL STEPS, AND KNOW WHERE THE DECISION POINTS ARE IN EACH OF THE STAGES. FOR THESE REASONS, THE AHG SHOULD RETAIN THE SUBSTANCE OF THE TACTICS PAPER.

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FROM US REP MBFR

7. THE UK REP REPLIED THAT HE FULLY UNDERSTOOD THE NEED TO MAKE COMMITMENTS IN ORDER TO GAIN CONCESSIONS. HE AGREED WITH THE CONCEPT OF PROGRESS TOWARD THEIR OBJECTIVES IN STEPS AND THAT THERE WERE POINTS ALONG THE WAY NEEDING DECISION BY THE AHG. HOWEVER, IT WOULD NOT ONLY BE IMPRACTICABLE, IT WOULD EXCEED THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE AHG TO LAY OUT AN ENTIRE NEGOTIATING PROGRAM NOW. TO DO SO WOULD REQUIRE AN EXTENSION OF CM (73) (83), AND THIS IS NOT A RESPONSIBILITY OF THE AHG. THE TACTICS PAPER, ON THE OTHER HAND, SHOULD BE A LIMITED PAPER ADDRESSING THE FIRST STEP TOWARD A LIMITED PROCEDURAL UNDERSTANDING. THE NETHERLANDS REP RESPONDED THAT HE DID NOT INTEND THAT THE AHG SHOULD GO BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THE TACTICS PAPER. HOWEVER, WITHIN THESE LIMITS, THE AHG COULD CONTROL DEVELOPMENT OF TACTICS.

8. THE BUNDESWEHR IN THE SECOND PHASE: REFERRING TO PARA 6 OF THE PAPER, DEALING WITH PROJECTED ALLIED RESPONSE TO SOVIET QUESTIONS

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TIONS ABOUT INCLUSION OF BUNDESWEHR IN SECOND PHASE, FRG REP (BEHREND) STATED THAT PROPOSED UK AMENDMENT (VIENNA 0618) WOULD SINGLE OUT THE BUNDESWEHR MORE, RATHER THAN LESS AS UK HAD INTENDED, AND THEREFORE FRG PREFERRED TO MAINTAIN THE ORIGINAL TEXT OF THE PAPER. THE ITALIAN REP (CAGIATI) SAID THAT HE SAW LITTLE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO TEXTS, AND THEREFORE EITHER ONE WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO HIM. NETHERLANDS REP SAID THAT HE PREFERRED PARA 6 AS IT STANDS IN PRINCIPAL TEXT. US REP SAID THAT THE US ALSO PREFERRED THE ORIGINAL LANGUAGE BUT COULD IF NECESSARY ACCEPT THE UK AMENDMENT. THE ITALIAN REP ALSO AGREED THAT THE PRESENT FORMULATION WAS ADEQUATE. AT THAT POINT, THE FRG REP SUGGESTED THAT A SUBSTITUTION OF APPROPRIATE LANGUAGE FROM THE CANADIAN PLENARY STATEMENT (VIENNA 0400) COULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO ALL MEMBERS OF THE AHG SINCE IT HAD BEEN APPROVED AND DELIVERED. THE UK REP THEN COMPARED THE LANGUAGE IN THE CANADIAN PLENARY STATEMENT WITH THAT IN THE TACTICS PAPER, AND CONCLUDED THAT THE ONLY DIFFERENCE WOULD BE THE SUBSTITUTION OF THE WORD "INCLUDE" IN PLACE OF THE WORD "INVOLVE" IN THE LAST SENTENCE OF PARA 6. THIS CHANGE WAS ACCEPTED BY AHG, WITH THE UK REP STATING THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO REFER IT TO HIS GOVERNMENT FOR APPROVAL, BUT THAT HE WAS HOPEFUL THAT IT WOULD BE ACCEPTED.

9. TACTICS ON NUCLEAR FORCES. THE US REP BEGAN DISCUSSION OF PARA 7 OF THE TACTICS PAPER BY OBSERVING THAT UK OBJECTIONS TO THIS PARA WERE APPARENTLY BASED ON BELIEF THAT IT IMPLIED ALLIED WILLINGNESS TO INCLUDE NUCLEAR FORCES IN MBFR. THE US REP PROPOSED A MODIFICATION TO THE PARA WHICH WOULD REAFFIRM ALLIED OPPOSITION TO INCLUSION OF THESE ELEMENTS. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE PARA SHOULD BE CHANGED BY ADDING NEW SECOND SENTENCE: "THEY MAINTAINED THEIR KNOWN VIEWS AGAINST THE INCLUSION OF AIR AND NUCLEAR FORCES." AND BY CHANGING OPENING OF FORMER SECOND SENTENCE TO READ: "HOWEVER, BY AGREEING NOW TO DISCUSS US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES...". THIS FORMULATION WAS ENDORSED BY THE FRG REP, AND SUPPORTED AD REF BY THE UK REP, WHO STATED HE FELT IT WENT A LONG WAY TOWARD MEETING THE UK POSITION. THE NETHERLANDS REP STATED THAT HE WOULD SUPPORT THE NEW WORDING; HOWEVER, IN SO DOING HE WANTED IT CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD THAT USE OF NUCLEARS WAS NOT FINALLY EXCLUDED; THE NETHERLANDS CONTINUES TO MAINTAIN ITS POSITION THAT THERE SHOULD BE A FULL AND COMPLETE STUDY IN NATO OF THE ISSUE OF INCLUSION OF NUCLEAR ELEMENTS IN MBFR, AND THAT NO FINAL DECISIONS IN THIS AREA SHOULD BE MADE UNTIL COMPLETION OF THIS STUDY. THUS,

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HIS SUPPORT OF PARA 7 AS MODIFIED IN NO WAY DIMINISHED THE POSITION OF THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT ON THE NEED FOR A STUDY.

10. DISCUSSION OF LINKAGE: AHG DISCUSSION MOVED TO PARA 5 OF THE TACTICS PAPER. THE UK REP STATED THAT HE HAD REPORTED THE RESULTS OF JAN 22 DISCUSSIONS TO THE UK FCO, AND THAT HE COULD NOT ADD TO THIS DISCUSSION UNTIL HE HAD RECEIVED A REPLY. THE US REP SUGGESTED THAT DISCUSSION ON THIS POINT BE HELD OVER UNTIL THE UK HAD RECEIVED THEIR REPLY, HOPEFULLY WITHIN THE NEXT DAY. THE NETHERLANDS REP SUGGESTED THAT A FORMULATION WHICH EXPLICITLY CALLED FOR AN AHG DECISION BEFORE THE ALLIES COMMITTED THEMSELVES TO USE THE "FIXED PERIOD OF TIME" FORMULATION MIGHT ALLAY SOME OF THE UK CONCERNS. AFTER DISCUSSION, THE AHG CONCLUDED THAT THIS PARA SHOULD BE CHANGED BY MODIFYING THE THIRD SENTENCE TO BEGIN AS FOLLOWS: "IF PRESSED FURTHER ON THE TIMING OF THE SECOND PHASE, THE ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES COULD, IF THE AD HOC GROUP CONSIDERED CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFIED IT, STATE THEIR VIEW THAT..."

11. THE US REP AGREED THAT SUCH A CHANGE COULD BE ACCEPTABLE. HOWEVER, THE US REP CAUTIONED THAT IT WAS ALREADY QUESTIONABLE WHETHER ALLIED FORMULATIONS TO SOVIETS IN THEIR ORIGINAL FORM WOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO GAIN DESIRED SOVIET CONCESSIONS. PARA 5 IS THE ONLY PLACE WHERE ANYTHING NEW IS OFFERED, AND THE ONLY THING NEW IN THAT PARA IS "WITHIN A FIXED PERIOD OF TIME." THE US REP CONTINUED THAT IT IS UNREALISTIC TO VIEW THE POINT WHEN THIS FORMULATION SHOULD BE PRESENTED TO EAST AS A LONG WAY OFF, IF THE ALLIES ARE IN GOOD FAITH TRYING TO INITIATE A DIALOGUE WITH THE EAST. THE NETHERLANDS REP SUPPORTED THE US REP, ADDING THAT HE

VISUALIZED A DAY-TO-DAY SCENARIO OF ADVANCING NEW LANGUAGE RATHER THAN A LONG TERM HIATUS. THE FRG REP BELIEVED THE TEXT WAS IMPROVED THROUGH ADDITION OF ADDITIONAL DECISION POINT AND ALSO AGREED FULLY WITH THE THOUGHTS OF THE US AND NETHERLANDS REPS. THE UK REP AGREED THAT THIS MODIFICATION IN TEXT OF PARA 5 PROVIDED A CERTAIN SAFEGUARD; HOWEVER, IT REALLY ADDS NOTHING NEW TO SUBSTANCE OF WHAT THE ALLIES ANTICIPATED WOULD ACTUALLY HAPPEN IN THE COURSE OF EVENTS. THE CHANGE MERELY MADE THE IMPLICIT INTO THE EXPLICIT AND DID NOT MEET SUBSTANTIVE UK OBJECTIONS TO THE FACT OF THE OFFER ITSELF.

12. THE US REP CONCLUDED SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION BY STATING HE HOPED THE UK GOVERNMENT WOULD NOW UNDERSTAND MORE CLEARLY THAT
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THERE IS NO INTENT IN THE TACTICS PAPER FOR THE ALLIES TO MAKE COMMITMENTS WHICH WOULD WEAKEN ALLIED RESOLVE FOR A COMMON CEILING. THE AHG THEN AGREED TO DEFER ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION OF THE TACTICS PAPER UNTIL THE NEXT AHG MEETING ON 24 JANUARY.

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FROM US REP MBFR

13. AHG ORAL REPORT TO NAC: BELGIAN REP ADRIAENSSEN) CIRCULATED A DRAFT OUTLINE OF THE ORAL REPORT HE INTENDED TO DELIVER ON BEHALF OF AHG TO NAC ON JANUARY 25 (SEPT), AND INVITED THE COMMENTS OF THE OTHER REPS. PRESENTATION WOULD BEGIN WITH A BRIEF CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS IN VIENNA SINCE RECESS, AND SUMMARIES OF PLENARY PRESENTATIONS BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE TWO SIDES. HE PROPOSED TO PROCEED TO A DISCUSSION OF DEVELOPMENTS IN THE AHG, BEGINNING WITH PAPER ON TACTICS. UK REP (ROSE) NOTED THAT THE SUMMARY OF TACTICS PAPER IN THE OUTLINE GAVE IMPRESSION THAT AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED ON IT. SINCE THIS NOT THE CASE, PRESENTATION TO NAC SHOULD BE COUCHED IN THE CONDITIONAL RATHER THAN THE FUTURE TENSE. BELGIAN REP INDICATED WILLINGNESS TO DROP MOST OF THIS PART OF THE PRESENTATION BECAUSE
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THE ISSUES WERE STILL UNRESOLVED.

14. BELGIAN REP THEN SAID HE HOPED THAT HIS PRESENTATION WOULD NOT GENERATE A NAC DISCUSSION OF TACTICS OR OF AHG DIFFICULTIES WITH PAPER. THE GROUP AGREED THAT HE SHOULD SEEK TO AVOID SUCH DISCUSSION, STATING THAT TACTICS WERE STILL UNDER DISCUSSION.

15. BELGIAN REP THEN TURNED TO PART OF HIS PLANNED PRESENTATION DESCRIBING DEVELOPMENTS SO FAR. HE SAID HE INTENDED MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

(1) USSR HAD SHOWN SOME FLEXIBILITY IN INITIAL PLENARY PRESENTATION ON 17 JANUARY; (2) USSR HAD REJECTED WESTERN PROPOSAL TO REDUCE FREQUENCY OF PLENARIES. US DEPREP SUGGESTED THAT EASTERN ATTITUDE WOULD BE MORE ACCURATELY DESCRIBED AS "INITIAL REJECTION" SINCE EASTERN REPS HAD INDICATED THEY WOULD RECONSIDER. (3) SOVIETS HAD REJECTED WESTERN PROPOSALS FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF WORKING GROUPS OR OCCASIONAL USE OF EMISSARIES. US DEPREP THOUGHT IT WOULD BE MORE POSITIVE AS WELL AS MORE ACCURATE DESCRIPTION OF EASTERN VIEW TO STATE THAT THEY PREFERRED INFORMAL SOCIAL OCCASIONS AT THIS POINT. AFTER SOME DISCUSSION IT WAS AGREED TO LEAVE THIS POINT OUT OF PRESENTATION SO AS NOT TO ENTRAIN COUNCIL DISCUSSION OF EMISSARY ISSUE. (4) KVITSINSKIY AND THE

POLES HAD EXPRESSED OPPOSITION TO REDUCING FREQUENCY OF PLENARIES OR DEVELOPMENT OF OTHER FORMS OF CONTRACT UNTIL THERE WERE INDICATIONS INFORMAL CONTACTS WOULD BRING PROGRESS. BELGIAN REP SAID PURPOSE THIS POINT WAS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT SOVIETS WERE TRYING TO EXACT CONCESSIONS AND SUBSTANCE IN RETURN FOR CERTAIN FORMS OF CONTACT.

16. TURNING TO A DESCRIPTION OF BILATERAL CONTACTS, ADRIAENSSEN SAID HE WANTED TO EMPHASIZE TO NAC THAT (1) CONTACTS HAD MOST INVOLVED THE SOVIETS ON EASTERN SIDE, (2) THE ATMOSPHERE REFLECTED APPARENT SOVIET DESIRE TO FIND COMMON GROUND WITH WEST, AND (3) THERE HAD BEEN NO SOVIET CONCESSIONS TO DATE. HOWEVER, HE WISHED ALSO TO SAY THAT SOVIET ATTITUDE HAD INDICATED SOME OPENINGS. THESE WERE: A CONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE OF THE SECOND PHASE; INTEREST IN THE COMMON CEILING AS A POSITIVE BASIS FOR REDUCTIONS; AND INTEREST IN MODALITIES FOR INCLUSION OF BUNDESWEHR.

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TIES FOR INCLUSION OF BUNDESWEHR.

17. WITH REGARD TO THE COMMON CEILING, THE ITALIAN REP POINTED OUT THAT THE EAST HAD INSISTED ON EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS. ALTHOUGH THE EAST MIGHT BE WILLING, SINCE THEY NOW ADMIT THE EXISTENCE OF DISPARITIES, TO TAKE OUT MORE MEN THAN WEST, THEY WOULD INSIST THAT PERCENTAGE BE THE SAME. THE FRG REP RECALLED A RECENT CONVERSATION WITH KVITSINSKIY IN WHICH LATTER HAD SAID THE EAST HAD BEGUN FROM AN ASSUMPTION OF PARITY. THUS AN EQUAL PERCENTAGE CUT WAS SAME AS AN EQUAL NUMBER CUT. SINCE THEY NOW ADMIT A DISCREPANCY, THEY SEEM TO BE SAYING THEY WOULD ACCEPT A LARGER CUT THAN WEST.

18. THE US DEP REP INDICATED THAT PORTION OF PRESENTATION CONCERNING SOVIET INTEREST IN A COMMON CEILING SHOULD INDICATE THAT THIS INTEREST IS BASED ON APPARENT ASSUMPTION THAT FORCES OF THE TWO SIDES ARE ROUGHLY EQUAL. BELGIAN REP AGREED, INDICATING THAT DIFFERING INTERPRETATIONS OF EASTERN VIEWS ON REDUCTIONS SUGGESTED THAT IT WAS TOO EARLY FOR AHG TO COMMIT ITSELF TO FIRM EXEGESIS OF SOVIET VIEWPOINT. HE WOULD RESTRICT HIMSELF TO A BRIEF MENTION OF THE SUBJECT.

19. BELGIAN REP THEN PROCEEDED TO FINAL PORTION OF HIS PROPOSED PRESENTATION: AN EVALUATION OF THE DEVELOPMENTS SO FAR. HE WOULD INDICATE THAT NEW SESSION OF NEGOTIATIONS WAS OFF TO A GOOD START. HOWEVER, IT WAS NECESSARY TO BE ALERT TO SOVIET MANEUVERS WHICH ARE DESIGNED TO OBTAIN MAXIMUM DETAILS CONCERNING THE SECOND PHASE AS A PRICE FOR AGREEING TO THE WESTERN IDEA ABOUT PHASES. THE WEST MUST ALSO BE AWARE OF POSSIBILITY THAT SOVIET INSISTENCE ON FREQUENT PLENARIES DOES NOT RESULT IN CREATION OF AN IMPRESSION OF STAGNATION IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, SERVING AS BASIS FOR ADVERSE PUBLICITY

DESIGNED TO INFLUENCE THE PUBLICS OF WESTERN COUNTRIES.

20. NEXT AD HOC MEETING WILL BE HELD AFTERNOON OF JANUARY

24. HUMES

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Message Attributes

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